Ninth Circuit: Immigrants Arrested Inside the U.S. Are Entitled to Bond Hearings

August 2026 | By Parikh & Prasad, PC

For nearly thirty years, someone who entered the United States without inspection and was later arrested inside the country could ask an immigration judge to set bond. In July 2025, the government stopped allowing it. On July 30, 2026, the Ninth Circuit held that the government had read the statute wrong.

What the Ninth Circuit Decided

Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, No. 25-6842 (9th Cir. July 30, 2026) holds that noncitizens present without admission who are apprehended in the interior of the United States are not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). They fall under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 instead — the provision that allows release on bond.

The panel affirmed summary judgment for a certified class of detained noncitizens in Western Washington. Judge Bress wrote; Judge Bea dissented. Argued in Seattle on March 4, 2026. The opinion is published, which makes its reading of the statute the law of the Ninth Circuit — California and Nevada included.

Two Detention Statutes, and Why the Difference Is Everything

Detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) is mandatory. In Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), the Supreme Court said that provision and its neighbor “unequivocally mandate that aliens falling within their scope ‘shall’ be detained.” No bond hearing. The only way out is parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), granted “only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.”

Detention under § 1226(a) is a different world. DHS still makes the first custody call, but the detained person can ask an immigration judge to redetermine it and can appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8), (d), 1236.1(d)(1), (3), 1003.19.

A hearing, or no hearing. That was the whole fight.

The Deeming Provision at the Center of the Fight

Section 1225(a)(1) came out of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. It “deems” an “alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States” to be an “applicant for admission.” The government’s position was that anyone deemed an applicant for admission is necessarily “seeking admission,” which drops them into § 1225(b)(2)(A) and its mandatory detention command.

The panel read it differently. The INA defines “admission” at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) as “the lawful entry . . . into the United States after inspection and authorization.” Put “seeking” in front of that and you are describing someone in the affirmative process of trying to get into the country — something that happens at the border or a port of entry. The court also had its own en banc precedent to work with. Torres v. Barr, 976 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2020), had already called “applicant for admission” a “term of art denoting a particular legal status,” one that places certain physically-but-not-lawfully present noncitizens into a “fictive legal status” for purposes of removal proceedings.

How the Policy Changed in 2025

The opinion traces the origin of the new interpretation to immigration judges in Tacoma, Washington, who began denying bond on this theory in 2022. The Board initially rebuffed them in a series of unpublished remands.

July 2025 reversed that. ICE issued guidance providing that, “effective immediately,” the only people eligible for a custody determination and release on bond under § 1226(a) were those “admitted to the United States” who had become deportable and were not otherwise subject to § 1226(c). Anyone who entered without inspection was “subject to detention under [§ 1225(b)(2)(A)]” and could not be released except by parole. In September 2025 the Board adopted that reading in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

Thousands of habeas petitions followed.

The Case Itself

Ramon Rodriguez Vazquez entered the United States in 2009, without admission or parole. In 2025 he was apprehended on a warrant and placed in removal proceedings. A Tacoma immigration judge denied him bond under the new interpretation.

He responded with a habeas petition and a class action complaint in the Western District of Washington. Judge Tiffany M. Cartwright certified a “Bond Denial Class” — everyone detained at the Northwest ICE Processing Center in Tacoma who was subject to mandatory detention under the government’s § 1225(b)(2)(A) policy — and granted the class partial summary judgment.

One detail from the opinion deserves attention. Rodriguez Vazquez did get his bond hearing. He was denied bond anyway, and then chose to depart the United States voluntarily rather than keep litigating. A bond hearing is an opportunity to be heard. It is not a release order.

Why the Court Rejected the Government’s Reading

The government’s construction produced surplusage. It strained the ordinary use of “seeking.” It did not sit well with the statute’s reference to an “examining immigration officer,” and it was in significant tension with Torres and with how Jennings described the scheme — “§ 1225(b) applies primarily to aliens seeking entry into the United States,” while “§ 1226 applies to aliens already present in the United States.”

Then the larger point. If Congress in 1996 had meant to require the mass detention of unadmitted noncitizens already living here, it would not have done it through a cross-referenced deeming provision. The “oblique and elliptical language” of § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not approach the clarity expected when Congress alters the fundamental details of a statutory scheme. And in thirty years, no administration ever found a duty to mandatorily detain unadmitted noncitizens picked up in the interior — “strong evidence that it does not exist.”

What the Decision Does Not Change

The panel was explicit about its limits, and this part matters as much as the holding. Class members remain subject to mandatory detention if they commit qualifying criminal offenses. They can still be denied bond and held through their removal proceedings if they pose a flight risk or a danger to the community.

Section 1226(c) still requires detention without bond for people who have committed certain crimes or who present national security concerns. The Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1, § 2, 139 Stat. 3 (2025), widened it: 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E) now mandates detention of people inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A) for presence without admission, § 1182(a)(6)(C) for misrepresentation, or § 1182(a)(7) for lack of documentation, who also commit various enumerated crimes.

The class excluded anyone subject to expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1). That regime reaches people arriving in the United States and — at the Attorney General’s discretion — those who have not affirmatively shown continuous physical presence for the two years before the inadmissibility determination.

Being deemed an “applicant for admission” also carries consequences that have nothing to do with detention. It brings a person within the inadmissibility framework rather than the deportability framework, and it puts the burden of proof on the noncitizen in removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(A).

The Class Judgment and the Precedent Are Different Things

The judgment affirmed here runs to the certified class at the Tacoma facility. The legal holding reaches further, because the opinion is published: its interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A) states the law of the circuit. If you or a family member is detained in California or Nevada and was denied bond solely on the theory that § 1225(b)(2)(A) requires detention, this is the controlling authority in your circuit.

The Rest of the Country Is Split

The opinion catalogues where the other courts of appeals have landed. The Fifth Circuit sided with the government in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026). The Eighth Circuit agreed in Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026). Each of those came over a dissent.

Four circuits went the other way: Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, 175 F.4th 61 (2d Cir. 2026); Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 175 F.4th 713 (6th Cir. 2026); Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin (10th Cir. June 30, 2026); and Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, 175 F.4th 1258 (11th Cir. 2026). The Seventh Circuit produced a splintered decision that commanded no majority on the question, though the plaintiffs won on the bottom line. Castañon-Nava v. DHS, 175 F.4th 828 (7th Cir. 2026).

At the district court level the imbalance is starker. The Second Circuit noted that over ninety percent of district judges to reach the question had sided with the petitioners. None of that resolves the national disagreement, and neither does this decision.

What a Bond Hearing Actually Requires

Eligibility for bond is not the same as getting bond. To be released, a person detained under § 1226(a) must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he is not a flight risk and not a danger to the community. Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006)). The burden sits with the detained person, and it is carried with evidence.

What to Do Now

If someone in your family is detained in the Ninth Circuit and was denied bond on the § 1225(b)(2)(A) theory, raise this decision with counsel immediately. It is the most directly applicable authority in this circuit.

If a custody redetermination was already denied on that ground, ask your attorney whether a renewed request before the immigration judge is appropriate in light of the ruling.

If a habeas petition is pending in a district court within the Ninth Circuit, make sure counsel knows about the decision.

Do not assume this means release. The decision restores access to a hearing. Bond can still be denied — it was denied to the named plaintiff in this very case.

Criminal history changes the analysis entirely. Section 1226(c), as expanded by the Laken Riley Act, may require detention without bond regardless of this ruling.

Expect further developments. This is a panel decision, and the courts of appeals are divided. The law here may not be settled.

At Parikh & Prasad, PC, we handle immigration detention and bond matters and federal habeas litigation in California, Nevada, and nationwide. If a family member is detained and has been denied a bond hearing, contact us to discuss what this decision means for that case.

This post is attorney advertising and is provided for general information only. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Immigration law changes rapidly; consult a qualified immigration attorney about your specific situation.

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